Research

In this essay, I argue that despite the apparent promise of the recently popular “robust omissions reply” to John Martin Fischer’s well-known robustness objection to flicker of freedom style responses to arguments against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) based on Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs), the robustness objection succeeds after all. Though I concede that the robust omissions reply is successful with the most promising extant variety of FSC (modified blockage) in view, I present a new kind of case—“Fischer-type modified blockage”—in which I claim the subject is basically morally responsible for what he’s done despite his lacking access to any robust alternative possibilities, and against which the robust omissions reply is ineffective. Along the way, I take advantage of an opportunity to show that my Fischer-type modified blockage case also serves to effectively undermine an otherwise promising recent defense, from Justin Capes, of David Widerker’s “W-defense” argument for PAP.

According to one recently popular “flicker of freedom” style response to Frankfurt-style arguments against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities—the “Triple O” flicker strategy—agents in Frankfurt-style cases are really or most fundamentally morally responsible for performing an action (A-ing) on their own, but not for A-ing simpliciter. This essay has two related aims. First, I offer an interpretation of the Triple O strategy which insulates it against an objection raised by Carolina Sartorio in “Flickers of Freedom and Moral Luck.” Second, I argue that a sub-version of the strategy (“the inheritance view”) according to which agents in Frankfurt-style cases are derivatively responsible for A-ing simpliciter in virtue of A-ing on their own, for which they are basically responsible, is untenable. I show that “A-ing simpliciter” is not plausibly an outcome of “A-ing on one’s own” in the sense required for the transfer of responsibility. Several candidates for the generative relation via which responsibility might be transferred are canvassed, and it is found that none of these relations plausibly hold between an agent’s A-ing on his own and his A-ing simpliciter. Next, I identify the generative relation (if any) that does hold between these items and show that the direction of generation problematically conflicts with the direction of the inheritance view’s purported transfer of responsibility.

In response to reflection on Frankfurt-style cases, most philosophers writing on free will and moral responsibility today have come to reject the thesis that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. It is surprising, then, that significant disagreement remains regarding the thesis that a person is morally responsible for what he has left undone only if he could have done it. Many maintain an asymmetry here: while responsibility for acting does not require alternative possibilities, responsibility for omitting to act does. In this project, I embrace the asymmetry and offer a novel and independently plausible explanation of why it holds. On my proposal, the asymmetry is grounded in a deep metaphysical difference: actions are concrete events, whereas omissions are (typically) absences—literally nothing. Responsibility for an action does not require alternatives because responsibility for a concrete event doesn’t. Responsibility for an omission, however, does require alternatives because—since omissions are absences—responsibility for an omission is responsibility only for a (non-concrete) state of affairs, and responsibility for such does require alternatives (or so I argue).

The ethics of nuclear deterrence was once much discussed among analytic philosophers. Since the end of the Cold War, however, they have had surprisingly little to say about it. Today, nuclear tensions are arguably at their highest point in four decades. While the international stage has changed significantly, the ethical questions concerning nuclear deterrence remain much the same. It is time for philosophers to return to the conversation. In this essay, I aim to help revive and advance the discussion by addressing two formidable arguments against the moral permissibility of nuclear deterrence. The first, popular during the Cold War era, appeals to the plausible principle that it is wrong to conditionally intend to do that which it would be wrong to do. The second, developed by Jeff McMahan, appeals to a related principle: that it is wrong to risk doing that which it would be wrong to do. I respond to both arguments in defense of the thesis that maintaining a policy of nuclear deterrence is morally permissible. If I’m right, then some better argument(s) will be needed to show that nuclear deterrence is impermissible. Near the end of the essay, I gesture toward such an argument.

Surprisingly, many philosophers working on free will and moral responsibility maintain the following asymmetry thesis: while responsibility for acting does not require alternative possibilities, responsibility for omitting to act does. Against proponents of this asymmetry thesis, I argue that the omission cases typically cited in its favor fail to adequately support it. To advance the debate, I develop two new Frankfurt-style omission cases that avoid shortcomings plaguing existing cases. These new cases, I contend, more strongly suggest that symmetry holds: neither responsibility for acting nor omitting to act requires alternatives.